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INTRODUCTION 
The State concedes Mr. Ham retains a diminished privacy 
interest under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and, presumably, under Article 1, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution (Brief of Appellee at 8) . As such, the State 
cannot rely on "reasonable suspicion" as justification for the 
search of Mr. Ham's refrigerator or the freezer; the State relys on 
Mr. Ham's alleged consent in that regard (Brief of Appellee at 9). 
As argued in the lower court (R. 177-99), the State continues 
to urge the Court to adopt the theory that Mr. Ham's Probation 
Agreement somehow provides a ready-made "voluntary consent," 
authorizing a probation officer's request and search without 
warrant and without reasonable suspicion. This type "consent" 
principle is without support and it was err for the lower court to 
have found or implied consent, as a matter of law, based on the 
Probation Agreement (R. 87). 
Additionally, the entire chain-of-events, from the initial 
search demand to the discovery of the last items of evidence 
seized, took place within a matter of several minutes, as opposed 
to hours. The record supports Mr. Ham's argument that no 
intervening factors or events occurred which would purge the taint 
of illegality from the entire sequence of events. As long as 
probation officers are allowed to conduct searches outside the 
scope of constitutional protections, individual constitutional 
rights will continue to be an illusory concept. 
POINT I 
MR. HAM'S PROBATION AGREEMENT DID NOT PROVIDE THE AUTHORITY TO 
SEARCH HIS REFRIGERATOR, FREEZER, OR ANY OTHER PORTION OF HIS 
RESIDENCE AND MR. HAM CERTAINLY DID NOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO 
OR IN ANY WAY INSTIGATE THE INITIAL SEARCH REQUEST. 
A Probation Agreement does not and cannot provide voluntary 
consent to search unless and until the officer ascertains a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the probationer is, was, or 
will be in violation of the terms of the Probation Agreement. In 
this case, the officers testified that there were no suspicions 
whatsoever regarding Mr. Ham violating the terms of his probation 
(R. 119) . Therefore, regardless of whether the search in this case 
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was as a result of a request or a demand, the conclusion that Mr. 
Ham gave constitutionally effective consent was erroneous as a 
matter of law. 
Additionally, the trial court's conclusion that by 
implication, Mr. Ham's consent to search the refrigerator was also 
consent to search the adjacent, but separate, freezer was 
erroneous, as a matter of law. There is no support in the record 
for the assumption that Agent McCullough's telling Mr. Ham he 
needed to look in the refrigerator for alcohol (R. 123) was a 
statement of his intent to conduct a general alcohol check, which 
naturally would include, by implication, the adjacent freezer. If 
such an assumption were correct, the search request would clearly 
violate Mr. Ham's right to privacy because any location in the home 
that might contain alcohol would be open to search by implication, 
based on an alleged consent to search the refrigerator. 
The State argues that Mr. Ham "ignores most of the 
circumstances and testimony supporting the trial court's 
conclusion." (Appellee's Brief at 10). The State's allegations 
here are wrong and the State simply ignores the fact that Agent 
McCullough, who was doing all of the talking to Mr. Ham, testified 
to the fact that he told Mr. Ham that he was going look in the 
refrigerator (R. 123, 124, 142). His testimony is devoid of any 
mention of a general alcohol check or any reference to the adjacent 
freezer. 
Additionally, the State argues Mr. Ham ignores the trial 
3 
court's findings that Mr. Ham verbally responded to a request by 
Agent McCullough for the search by saying "go ahead" or words to 
that effect. (Appellee's Brief at 14). What the State fails to 
mention, and the lower court failed respect, is the fact that Agent 
McCullough himself testified that he basically had no idea of what 
Mr. Ham said or even if Mr. Ham actually responded at all. The 
specific dialogue containing the alleged "go ahead" response went 
as follows: 
Q I am going to ask you again to make sure I finish my question 
before you answer. All right? How did [Mr. Ham] respond to 
your statement that you needed to go in the refrigerator for 
alcohol? 
A Did not respond. I do not remember any particular 
conversation, exactly what was said, that he did not have any 
objection, and I believe he said go ahead, but I do not recall 
specifically. 
(R. 123-24) (emphasis added). 
The State also ignores, and the lower courtf s findings fail to 
address, the fact that according to Agent McCullough, Mr. Ham and 
he conversed for less than 60 seconds before McCullough actually 
commenced his search of Mr. Ham's refrigerator (R. 143). 
Apparently Mr. Ham was supposed to freely make an intelligent, 
unequivocal and specific "voluntary consent" to the search of his 
freezer, even though only the refrigerator was identified as the 
target of the search, all within less than a minute. 
The State argues that Mr. Ham should have reasonably known 
that the demand to look in the refrigerator included the freezer 
because "a reasonable person would know that both the refrigerator 
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and the freezer could be used to chill alcohol." (Appellee's Brief 
at 18). Under the State's argument, Mr. Ham would have had to 
anticipate that if he did consent to the search of his 
refrigerator, that consent, by implication, would include any and 
all locations which could conceivably hold a container of alcohol 
since not all alcohol requires refrigeration. 
Citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991), the State 
argues that a request to search an automobile for drugs includes 
all containers within the automobile that might contain drugs and, 
by analogy, a request to search a refrigerator for alcohol must 
include all containers within the home that might contain alcohol. 
Such an analogy does not make sense. Mr. Ham concedes that if the 
Court determines he actually or impliedly consented to the search 
of the refrigerator, such consent would include all areas and 
compartments within the refrigerator that might contain alcohol. 
However, such consent can in no way imply coverage of any other 
areas since the demand (or request) specifically and only 
identified the refrigerator. 
The State argues that the officers did not deceive or trick 
Mr. Ham in procuring his consent to search, yet the State ignores 
the fact that under state and federal constitutional analysis, 
these officers did not have the right to search anything - they had 
no reasonable suspicion that anything was wrong. Agent McCullough, 
within a minute of starting his conversation, tells Mr. Ham "we 
need to look in the fridge for alcohol" (R. 123) . The State 
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ignores the fact that in this situation, these probation officers 
were inherently conducting their affairs under a claim of 
authority, which in and of itself carries an element of force. 
There simply is not enough convincing evidence to establish 
constitutionally effective consent. The trial court erred when it 
concluded Mr. Ham voluntarily consented to the initial search, and 
especially when it concluded the freezer search was consented to by 
implication. 
POINT II 
THERE ARE NO GROUNDS TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION THAT 
INTERVENING EVENTS PURGED THE SUBSEQUENT DISCOVERY OF 
CONTRABAND FROM THE TAINT OF THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY. 
The initial demand to search Mr. Ham's refrigerator, without 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of a probation violation, was a 
violation of Mr. Ham's constitutional rights under Article 1, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and under the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. Even if Mr. Ham's conduct is 
construed as voluntary consent to search his refrigerator, failure 
to locate any illegal contraband in that appliance makes the 
expansion of the search illegal and the evidence must be 
suppressed. See, e.g. , State v. Chapman, 2 72 Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 
1995) . 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that an 
illegal search cannot be "validated by what it turns up." Wong Sun 
v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). Without violating Mr. 
Ham's constitutional right to privacy, the officers would not have 
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had any reason whatsoever to believe Mr. Ham was in violation of 
his probation agreement. Therefore, locating the alcohol in the 
freezer, which provided the reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
expand the search even further, cannot be validated simply because 
evidence establishing illegal conduct was discovered. 
The State argues the final events were so attenuated from 
prior illegalities that they were purged of all taint; that Mr. Ham 
voluntarily consented to the final search. However, voluntariness 
is not the only factor that must be considered in determining 
whether this consent is valid, thereby making subsequent 
discoveries admissible. 
A second question that must be answered regarding the validity 
of consent following police illegality is "whether the consent was 
obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality . 
whether the 'taint' of the Fourth Amendment violation was 
sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence." 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) (citations 
omitted). The principle underlying the exploitation test is that 
the Fourth Amendment should not permit law enforcement to "ratify 
their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a consent after the 
illegality has occurred." Id. (Citing State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 
684, 689 (Utah 1990)). 
The primary goal of Arroyo was to deter police from "engaging 
in illegal conduct even though that conduct may be followed by a 
voluntary consent to the subsequent search." Id. In the present 
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case, the Agents were experienced, well trained probation officers 
who knew and had a complete understanding of the state and federal 
laws regarding search and seizure (R. 136). 
Both Agents were familiar with the standard terminology of the 
Probation Agreements, which includes an understanding that searches 
would be authorized only upon the ascertainment of reasonable, 
articulable suspicions of probation violations. The egregiousness 
of this misconduct and the need to deter similar occurrences of 
misconduct in the future far outweighs any detriment suppression of 
the evidence in this case might have upon society. Based on the 
officer's testimony that their search was commenced within 60 
seconds of their contact with the probationer, even though they had 
no suspicions of any kind regarding violations, it is obvious that 
this conduct is a regular and accepted practice within the 
probation department. 
It is almost impossible to believe the State's argument that 
these officers were not acting with intentional and flagrant 
disregard for the "reasonable suspicion" standard espoused by the 
very Probation Agreement that allegedly authorized their presence 
at Mr. Ham's residence. It is equally hard to believe these 
officers, with their years of experience, actually believed they 
"had complied with what the Fourth Amendment required of them 
before they could legally search." (Appellee's Brief at 22). 
The initial illegality up to the final discovery of 
incriminating evidence was a step by step process, each step of the 
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process linked and in no way purged of the taint from the previous 
step. Agent McCullough testified that within a minute of starting 
to talk with Mr. Ham, the officers commenced their search (R. 143) . 
Upon locating the alcohol in the freezer, they immediately told Mr. 
Ham to accompany them while they expanded their search to the rest 
of the house (R. 126, 145-46, 170). A very brief search of the 
remainder of the up-stairs was conducted, not taking "any time to 
go through stuff in the upstairs at that point," and then the 
officers directed Mr. Ham to show them the downstairs portion of 
the house, "almost as an after thought." (R. 145-46). 
Once in the basement, the officers immediately located a 
cooler containing beer on ice in plain sight (R. 146), then Agent 
Hillam went to an adjacent room and located a mirror that allegedly 
had cocaine on it, along with other contraband (R. 147), at which 
time Agent Hillam immediately returned to where Mr. Ham was located 
and placed him under arrest (R. 147) . Without providing a Miranda 
warning, Agent Hillam began interrogating Mr. Ham and Mr. Ham told 
the officers about additional drugs in the basement (R. 163), 
following which Miranda was given and further interrogations took 
place (R. 131). 
The record establishes there was no break in sequence, no 
intervening event, no attenuation of the connections between one 
step in the process to the next. "The notion of the 'dissipation 
of the taint1 attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental 
consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the 
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deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its 
cost." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1272. (Citation omitted). The 
subsequent consent to the search down stairs is no where near the 
attenuation point where the cost to society would outweigh any 
deterrent effect of exclusion in this case. Only by exclusion in 
cases such as the present can the probation officers be deterred 
from future conduct of the same nature. 
CONCLUSION 
Probation officers do not have the right to request or conduct 
searches of a probationer's person, residence, or any other 
property unless and until they first ascertain reasonable, 
articulable suspicions of some type illegality or probation 
violation. In Mr. Ham's case, the officers had no suspicions, yet 
they demanded (or requested) a search of his refrigerator. The 
officers then exceeded the scope of this demand by searching a 
separate appliance in the residence, which was further exploited to 
the remainder of the home. 
All evidence, from the initial illegal search request through 
to and including post-Miranda evidence, was and is tainted by the 
officers1 conduct that was initiated within 60 seconds of Mr. Ham's 
conversation with Agent McCullough; all evidence is fruit of the 
poisonous tree and must be suppressed accordingly. See Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Ham respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court's suppression ruling and remand 
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the case accordingly. 
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